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Abstract. Existing literature on property rights stresses the e¤ect that
distortions in future investment decisions have on establishing the optimal
property rights. This paper demonstrates that property rights may also
be a¤ected by contracts which exist prior to the establishment of property
rights. We consider a two-period model where a rms claimholders have
contracts on current earnings and must determine the allocation of property
rights on the rms residual assets. The allocation of these rights a¤ects
the claimholdersincentives to undertake optimal nancial decisions which
simultaneously a¤ects current cash ows and the rms residual value. We
argue that property rights should be connected to the existing contracts
through the rule of marginal revenues in order to mitigate the intertemporal
substitution (earnings manipulation) problem.
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1 Introduction.
The rules governing the allocation of property rights have become a major
topic in economic and nancial theory. It is di¢ cult to optimally distribute a
large number of various rights between shareholders, creditors, managers, etc.
The best known contribution in this area is the property rights approach
(PRA).1 This approach is based on the observation that certain types of
arrangements may be contractible (non-residual actions and rights) while
others are not contactible. In the latter case, it is impossible to write com-
plete contracts which determine the optimal actions in any scenario (residual
actions and rights). Therefore, control over residual actions becomes im-
portant. The allocation of property rights, which are usually contractible,
determines which party has control. Subsequent PRA related literature has
presented several theories concerning rmsnancial structures which are
based on the allocation of control rights. Early examples of such analysis
predict that a combination of debt and equity is optimal.2 Such nancial
structures allow an e¢ cient distribution of control rights. These typically
use the following rule: if a rm performs well, control goes to the sharehold-
ers, and control passes to the creditors otherwise.
Empirical literature in this eld generally conrms the fact that the share-
holders retain control when the business is performing relatively well while
control passes to the creditors when the opposite is true. This literature
also stresses that, while in real nancial contracts the allocation of control
rights plays an important role, the parties involved usually make separate
determinations for the allocation of various kinds of property rights. These
rights include residual cash ow rights, liquidation rights, board rights etc.
Moreover, there are signicant quantitative di¤erences between the percent-
ages of di¤erent rights allotted to the parties.3. Recent literature on nancial
contracts involving the allocation of property rights has made two important
contributions. First, it has explained why, in many cases (especially within
venture capital rms), investors usually hold convertible securities and not
1Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).
2Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Hart (1995).
3See, for instance, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) with
regard to venture capital contracts and Gilson (1990) for corporate contracts.
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simply debt.4 Second, it has explained why the di¤erence between control
rights and property rights may exist.5 However, many questions regarding
the links between security holdersdi¤erent rights remain unanswered. For
instance, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, p. 313) write: "Our results clearly
show that real world contracts are more complex than existing theories pre-
dict. For example....the allocations of cash ow and control rights and the
use of contingencies are related in systematic ways..."
This paper points out that property rights may also be a¤ected by con-
tracts which exist prior to the establishment of property rights. We consider
a situation where two parties bargain about the property rights on a rms
residual assets. We assume that the resulting fractions of ownership enti-
tle each party to the right to the corresponding fraction of the rms future
earnings (the results of the paper will still hold if there is deviation from
the one share-one vote rule as long as the parties rationally anticipate this
di¤erence). In contrast to most existing literature, the parties have issued
contracts on the rms current earnings (hereafter NR) prior to determining
the allocation of property rights. Essentially, the paper analyzes the links be-
tween these contracts and property rights (RR). We look at this link through
the intertemporal substitution (earnings manipulation) argument.
Earnings manipulation is di¤erent from earnings misreporting. The lat-
ter means presenting incorrect information about a rms results to the
cliamholders and the public. The central characteristic of the former is in-
tertemporal substitution: the decision-maker may engage in activities which
move cash ows from one period to another. Some typical examples include
delaying the approval of important decisions, ine¢ cient investments, borrow-
ing in order to manipulate nancial results, ine¢ cient discount policy etc.6
The rm can also use di¤erent accounting strategies such as the choice of
inventory and depreciation methods, the expensing of research and develop-
ment, the estimation of pension liabilities, and the capitalization of leases
and marketing expenses. When an action from the above list has a posi-
tive social value, earnings management takes place, otherwise - and this is
the focus of the present paper - earnings manipulation takes place. If the
decision-maker is the rms manager, the objective of earnings manipulation
4Berglof (1994), Kalay and Zender (1997), Gompers (1998), Schmidt (2003) and Cor-
nelli and Yoscha (2003).
5Kirilenko, 2001.
6Roychowdhury (2006) provides extensive evidence on earnings management through
real activities manipulation.
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is usually to increase the rms short-term performance and thereby achieve
some threshold. The reasons for managers"short-termism" are well known.
The most important reason is the di¤erence between a rms life horizon and
a managers expected period of employment. However, if the rms major
claimholders are involved in intertemporal substitution, the target is not only
the current payo¤s to the holders of securities but also (and perhaps rst of
all), the residual rights of the holders of securities and, most importantly,
property rights.
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) found that IPOs (initial public o¤erings),
which are typically the major event a¤ecting the distribution of property
rights, are almost always preceded by aggressive earnings management. In
their conclusion, the authors stress that investors must carefully interpret ac-
counting information provided by the issuing rm. In our view, this can only
be done by understanding the link between the allocation of property rights
in the new rm and the incentive to manipulate earnings. Our analysis shows
that the allocation of property rights may signicantly a¤ect the claimhold-
ers incentive to engage in intertemporal substitution. For instance, if the
decision-maker is the only owner of the future business, he will be interested
in shifting value from the current rm to the future rm even if this action
is socially ine¢ cient.
We argue that the optimal situation occurs when RR are distributed ac-
cording to the current marginal revenues of existing securities. For instance,
if the current marginal cash ow rights of the decision-maker are 15% (if the
rms value increases by $1, the payo¤ to the agent will increase by 15c), his
optimal fraction of ownership in the future business should also be 15%. This
provides decision-makers with the optimal incentives to choose intertemporal
substitutions.
The problem with this simple argument is that, since current cash ow
rights are usually non-linear, a large manipulation of earnings (going beyond
the threshold) can lead to disproportionate changes in marginal current cash
ow and RR. We show, however, that the marginal revenue rule may work.
Optimal incentives can be implemented when contracts are piece-wise
linear, the parties observe certain signals regarding the state of nature, and
the allocation of control rights is state-contingent (optimal incentives can
be implemented - delete).(Sorry - I didnt read it as a list - nu-
meration is not necessary - rearanging the sentence claries) As is
typically analyzed in the literature, standard securities such as debt, equity,
and convertible equity are consistent with this theory. An interesting direc-
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tion for further empirical research would be to verify this rules consistency
when applied to other securities.7
The recent wave of scandals in the corporate world (Worldcom, Enron,
Nortel etc.) has shown that earnings manipulation is playing an important
role in corporate life. Existing theoretical literature typically focuses on the
implications of earnings manipulation on the design of managers compen-
sation contracts (see, for instance, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999),
Jensen (2003) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005)). In Degeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1999), a manager with a bonus-like contract may manipulate
earnings in order to exceed some threshold. In the present paper, we fo-
cus on how earnings manipulation a¤ects the allocation of di¤erent rights
between security holders. We look at the problem not as a single manager
moral hazard problem, but rather as a problem where the decision-making
process is split among di¤erent security holders. Under this approach, the
papers results can be applied to entrepreneurial rms, venture capital rms,
corporations with a large shareholder, and any other rms where investors
are involved in the decision-making process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model; Sections 3 and 4 analyze optimal property rights when current cash
ow rights are two-part linear and three-part linear respectively. Section 5
discusses the models results with regard to empirical evidence and Section
6 presents the conclusion.
2 Model.
Consider a rm with assets in place which are expected to generate a cash
ow R in the rst period. The cash ow is distributed according to the
distribution function F (R) and the density function f(R); R 2 [0; R]. The
companys assets which remain at the end of rst period may yield the rev-
enue C in the second period. The rms nal rst-period prot is R1 = R
 a, where a is a prot correction arising from intertemporal substitution.
7This would be interesting because the set of observable securities is much larger than
just the set of standard securities. For example, Brealey, Myers and Allen (2005, p. 964)
write: In the last 20 years companies and security exchanges have created an enormous
number of new securities: options, futures, options on futures, zero-coupon bonds [....] the
list is endless.
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Earnings in period 2 are R2 = C + c(a), c0  0, c00  0, c(0) = 0.8
Before R is realized, the parties should establish property rights, j(R1),
on the assets which remain at the end of rst period (accordingly j(R1)R2
is the second-period payo¤ of claimholder j; j 2 f1; 2g). We have
1(R1) + 2(R1) = 1;8R1 (1)
where
0  j(R1)  1;8j (2)
The rm has issued two claims: for claimholders A and B respectively.
As contract (his rst-period payo¤) is T1(R1) and that of B is T2(R1).
T1(R1) + T2(R1) = R1;8R1 (3)
Let us assume:
(i) Tj(R1); 8j are monotonic and either two-part or three-part linear func-
tions from [0; R] into [0; R]. Denote the breaking point of two-part contracts
by Rt1 and the breaking points of three-part contracts by Rt1 and Rt2, where
Rt1 < Rt2.9 Tj(R1); j 2 f1; 2g cannot be renegotiated.10
(ii) Earnings are non-negative in both periods, i. e. R1 2 [0; R]; a 2
[R   R;R] and C 2 [C;1), where C =  c( R). Since c(a) is increasing in
a, this condition guarantees that
R2 = C + c(a)  0 (4)
(iii) a = argmaxa[c(a)  a] = 0.
It follows from the model description that: 1) intertemporal substitution
activities a¤ect current prot and residual benets in opposite directions; 2)
a = 0 is socially optimal because a = argmaxa(R   a + C + c(a)), where
the expression in brackets represents the rms total earnings; 3) the negative
8In this setting an "investment" can be seen as an action with a > 0 and a liquidation
of assets or borrowing can be seen as an action with a < 0.
9Only piece-wise linear contracts are considered since these are the most common type
of contracts observed in reality. The case of linear contracts is not considered because the
problem of intertemporal substitution does not arise (see Jensen, 2003). Also, contracts
with a high-number-of-pieces (more than 3) are not considered to be realistic. However,
the analysis can easily be extended to those cases.
10This condition insures that the Coase theorem (1960), which concerns the irrelevance
of property rights, does not apply.
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impact of intertemporal substitution activities increases with deviations from
a and; 4) the condition (2) and assumptions (i) and (ii) imply two-sided
limited liability in both the rst and second periods.11
A and B meet to discuss the optimal choice of a. We assume that both
parties are not wealth-constrained. If R is veriable, they can write a con-
tract which imposes large sanctions on each party if R1 6= R (both parts of
this condition are veriable by a court). If the penalties are large enough, the
decision-maker will choose a = a. The same holds if a is veriable. Also, if
the parties have veto power on any transaction then the problem of intertem-
poral substitution will disappear: from assumption (iii) any a 6= 0 reduces
the payo¤ of at least one party. However, such a monitoring or decision-
making process is costly and unrealistic. Hence, we assume that only R1 is
veriable. Therefore, we focus on the following situation. A is the initial
decision-maker, i. e. he has the right to choose a. After the parties observe
R, they may renegotiate the control rights.12 This means that A can sell the
control rights to B. Following this, the party which has control chooses a.
As in the property rights approach, it is assumed that, since the parties
are able to make payments to each other, they will choose the property
rights which maximize the total surplus. Property rights should provide
the decision-maker with the optimal incentive to choose a. The game is as
follows:
1. Property rights j(R1); j 2 f1; 2g are established. A money transfer
is made if necessary.
2. The parties observe R , and A may sell the control rights.13 Dene
d(R) (control) as follows: d(R) = 1 if A retains control and d(R) = 2 if A
sells control to B.
3. If d(R) = 1, A chooses a. If d(R) = 2, B chooses a.
4. R1 becomes known (R1 = R   a) and the parties receive their rst-
11See Innes (1990) and Robe (1999) for theoretical and practical issues related to limited
liability rules.
12The usage of di¤erent kinds of signaling is typical in nancial contract literature. This
is based on Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) in that the allocation of di¤erent rights is usually
contingent on some mesures of intermediate performance. For other kinds of signaling see
Zender (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Hellman
(2005).
13Since neither party is wealth-constrained, the specic mechanics of bargaining about
the price in stages 1 and 2 is irrelevant. It can a¤ect the price but not the optimal features
of security design. The optimal scenario, which maximizes the total surplus, will always
be chosen.
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period payo¤s Tj(R1). j(R1); j 2 f1; 2g become known.
5. R2 is realized (R2 = C + c(a)) and the parties receive their residual
payo¤s j(R1)R2.
3 Two-part linear contracts.
First, let us consider the incentive of an agent j with a two-part linear con-
tract Tj assuming that the residual (second-period) property rights equal the
current marginal cash ow rights: j(R1) = T 0j(R1). Let
Tj = kj1R1; R1  Rt1
Tj = kj1Rj1 + kj2(R1  Rt1); R1 > Rt1 (5)8<:
j = kj1; R1 < Rt1
j = kj2; R1 > Rt1
j = kj3  maxfkj1; kj2g; R1 = Rt1
(6)
where kj1 6= kj2. For our purposes, the following analysis will be useful. Let
Wj(a;R) be the nal payo¤ of claimholder j if R is realized and action a is
undertaken. Let aj = argmaxaWj(R; a). If a

j = 0 and j is the decision-
maker, the decision is optimal. By denition
Wj(R; a) = Tj(R  a) + j(R  a)(C + c(a))
Given (5)-(6), this is equivalent to:
Wj(R; a) =
8<:
kj1(R  a) + kj1(C + c(a)); R  a < Rt1
kj1Rt1 + kj3(C + c(R Rt1)); R  a = Rt1
kj1Rt1 + kj2(R  a Rt1) + kj2(C + c(a)); R  a > Rt1
(7)
The following is useful.
Lemma 1. Wj(R; a) is discontinuous in a when a = R   Rt1 and is
continuous otherwise. Furthermore
@Wj(R; a)
@a

 0 if a
<
>
0 and Rt1 6= R  a (8)
lima!R Rt1+0Wj(R; a)

 lima!R Rt1 0Wj(R; a) if kj1
>
<
kj2 (9)
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Proof. The rst part follows directly from (7) and kj1 6= kj2. Next from
(7), @Wj(R;a)
@a
= T 0j(R   a)(@c(a)@a   1). From assumption (i) T 0j(R   a)  0.
Therefore, (8) follows from assumption (iii) and c00  0. The condition (9)
follows from
lima!R Rt1+0Wj(R; a)  lima!R Rt1 0Wj(R; a) = (kj1  kj2)(C + c(R Rt1))
and assumption (ii). End proof.
Intuitively, the payo¤ function is discontinuous at the break-points be-
cause this leads to a jump in RR. The condition (8) is based on the idea that
increasing the magnitude of prot correction is unprotable when RR do not
change.
Let
s =

1 if R < Rt1
2 if R > Rt1
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 1 for the case of a concave contract.
-
6
0R Rt1 a
W (R; a)
a
-
6
0 R Rt1 a
W (R; a)
b
Figure 1. Wj(R; a) when kj1 > kj2 and: a) s = 1; b) s = 2.
When Rj1 > R   a (Figure 1a) the optimal choice is a = 0 because no
deviation from this can increase RR. In contrast, if Rj1 < R   a, such de-
viations can be protable because they may increase RR. As one can see,
two possibilities exist. If the benets from increasing RR are more impor-
tant than the loss in social prot then a deviation toward the break-point
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is optimal (thick line on the right side of Figure 1b). If not, the optimal
a = a (doted line). Also, in both cases it is never protable for the concave
claimholder to have a < a.
Lemma 2. 1) Let kj1 > kj2. If s = 1 then aj = 0; 2) Let kj1 < kj2. If
s = 2 then aj = 0.
Proof. Let kj1 > kj2 and consider the case where R < Rt1. From Lemma
1,
Wj(R; a j a < R Rt1)  lima!R Rt1 0Wj(R; a)  lima!R Rt1+0Wj(R; a)  Wj(R; 0)
and
Wj(R; 0)  Wj(R; a j a  R Rt1)
(see also Figure 1a). Thus, aj = 0.
14 The argument is analogous for the case
kj1 < kj2 and R > Rt1. End proof.
It is clear from Lemma 2 that when R < Rt1, it is optimal for the concave
claimholder to have control. If, in contrast, R > Rt1, it is optimal for the
convex claimholder to have control.
Lemma 3. 1) Let kj1 > kj2 and s = 2: If j R   Rt1 j is su¢ ciently
small then aj 6= 0; 2) Let kj1 < kj2 and s = 1. If j R Rt1 j is su¢ ciently
small then aj 6= 0.
Proof. First consider the case where kj1 > kj2 and s = 2. Let us compare
Wj(R; 0) and limR!Rt1+0Wj(R;Rt1   R). From (7) the di¤erence between
them equals:
lim
R!Rt1+0
[kj1Rt1 + kj2(R Rt1) + kj2C   kj1Rt1   kj1(C + c(Rt1  R))] =
(kj2   kj1)C < 0
Since the di¤erence between Wj(R; 0) and limR!Rt1+0Wj(R;Rt1   R) is
strictly negative, the lemma follows from the continuity of Wj(R;Rt1   R)
for R > Rt1 which is implied by Lemma 1. The argument is analogous for
the case where kj1 < kj2 and s = 1. End proof.
The meaning of Lemma 3 is that if kj1 > kj2 and s = 2 or kj1 < kj2
and s = 1, the decision-makers choice cannot be optimal for all R. This
14We assume that if j is indi¤erent between a and any other a, he will choose a.
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makes the transfer of control rights necessary. For instance, the entrepreneur
(typically the claimholder with a convex contract or with a contract where
kj1 < kj2) is often reluctant to bankrupt the rm even if it is socially opti-
mal (s = 1). This is because it usually leads to low residual rights for the
entrepreneur.15
Now we can formulate the conditions under which the optimal a is chosen.
Proposition 1. Let T1(R1) be two-part linear. The optimal a (a = 0) is
chosen for any R if and only if: 1) j(R1) = T 0j(R1);8R1 6= Rt1;8j 2 f1; 2g
and/or?; 2) T1(R1) is convex and d(R j s = 1) = 2, d(R j s = 2) = 1, or
T1(R1) is concave and d(R j s = 1) = 1, d(R j s = 2) = 2.
Proof. Part 1. Su¢ ciency. Let 1(R1) = T 01(R1);8R1 6= Rt1 and
1(Rt1) = maxfk11; k12g. Obviously T1(R1) satises (5) and (6). The
conditions (3), (1), and (2) imply that T2(R1) and 2(R1) also satisfy (5)
and (6) because 2(Rt1) = 1   maxfk11; k12g = minf1   k11; 1   k12g 
maxf1   k11; 1   k12g. Therefore, lemmas 1 and 2 can be applied for both
agents. Thus, su¢ ciency follows from Lemma 2. More precisely, consider
the case when As contract is convex (it can be shown analogously for the
concave case). If s = 2 then A retains control. According to Lemma 2, As
choice will be optimal. If s = 1 then B gets control and his decision will be
optimal.
Necessity. Consider the incentive of j regarding the choice of a when
R 6= Rt1. Note that such a state of nature has a positive Borel measure. We
have:
Wj(R; a) = Tj(R  a) + j(R  a)(C + c(a))
@Wj
@a
=  T 0j (R1)  
0
j(R1)(C + c(a)) + j(R1)
@c(a)
@a
For a = 0 we have:
@Wj
@a
ja=0=  T 0j (R)  
0
j(R)C + j(R)
@c(a)
@a
ja=0
According to assumption (ii), @c(a)
@a
= 1 when a = 0. Thus, @Wj
@a
=  T 0j (R) 

0
j(R)C+j(R). If this does not equal 0, the choice a = 0 cannot be optimal
for j. Thus, we have the following (di¤erential) equation:
y = x  Cx0 (10)
15See, for instance, Titman (1984).
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where x = j(R) and y = T
0
j (R). The solution of this di¤erential equation is
x = y (note that y0 = 0 because contracts are piece-wise linear and R 6= Rt1).
Hence, we have: 
0
j(R) = 0 and j(R) = T
0
j (R). This implies that
j(R1) = T
0
j(R1);8j (11)
given T 01(R1) + T
0
2(R1) = 1;8R1 6= Rt1.
Part 2. From Part 1, the optimal choice of a cannot be guaranteed if
(11) does not hold. Consider the case when it holds and suppose that As
contract is convex (it can be shown analogously for the concave case). If the
proposition does not hold, the three alternative possibilities are: d(R j s =
1) = d(R j s = 2) = 1; d(R j s = 1) = d(R j s = 2) = 2 and d(R j s = 1) = 1,
d(R j s = 2) = 2. None of these can guarantee the optimal choice of a as
implied by Lemma 3. End proof.
The condition (10) has an easy interpretation. T
0
j (R1) shows the marginal
rst-period revenue of j while j(R)   0j(R)C shows his marginal second-
period revenue which includes RR and a marginal correction of RR (in the
opposite direction to the changes in rst-period revenue). If the former is
larger than the latter, j is interested in shifting rst-period cash ow to the
second period. If the latter is larger than the former, j will inate rst-period
prot. The optimal a can only be chosen if (10) holds.
Table 1. Di¤erent rights of security holders when contracts are
two-part linear.
R < Rt1 R > Rt1
Claim 1
Current cash ow rights convex
Current control rights No Yes
Residual property rights Lower than when R > Rt1 Higher than when R < Rt1
Claim 2
Current cash ow rights concave
Current control rights Yes No
Residual property rights Higher than when R > Rt1 Lower than when R < Rt1
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis in this section. Note that
it can easily be generalized by allowing any number of two-part linear convex
12
and concave contracts with a break-point Rt1. This is because the distribu-
tion of current decision rights among convex claimholders (when s = 2) or
among concave claimholders (when s = 1) does not matter: in both cases
the decision will be unanimous. This is consistent with the free-rider phe-
nomenon where most claimholders do not really participate in the decision-
making process. However, the distribution of property rights should follow
the strict rule of marginal revenue for every voting contract.
4 Three-part linear contracts.
The model presented in the previous section illustrates why the parties may
su¤er from earnings manipulation when the property rights do not follow the
rule of marginal revenues (for the case when existing contracts are two-part
linear). For the case of three-part linear contracts, there is a set of contracts
for which the problem of earnings manipulation can be eliminated through
the rule of marginal revenues. However, there also exists a set of contracts for
which earnings manipulation is unavoidable. Below we present an outline of
the main results (formal derivations are omitted for brevity and are available
upon request). Let8<:
Tj = kj1R1; R1  Rt1
Tj = kj1Rt1 + kj2(R1  Rt1); Rt1 < R1  Rt2
Tj = kj1Rt1 + kj2(Rt2  Rt1) + kj3(R1  Rt2); Rt2 < R1
(12)
where kj1 6= kj2 and kj2 6= kj3 and suppose that property rights follow the
rule of marginal revenues:8>>>><>>>>:
j = kj1; R1 < Rt1
j = kj2; Rt1 < R1  Rt2
j = kj3; Rt2 < R1
j = kj4  maxfkj1; kj2g; R1 = Rt1
j = kj5  maxfkj2; kj3g; R1 = Rt2
(13)
Consider the case k11 < k12 and k13 < k12 (Figure 3a, thick line). When
Rt1 < R < Rt2, the optimal choice is a = 0 because no deviation from this
can increase RR. In contrast, if R < Rt1 or R > Rt2, such deviations can
be protable because they may increase RR. Two possibilities exist. If the
benets from increasing RR are more important than the loss in the rms
total prot then deviating toward the break-point is optimal. This happens
13
when R is su¢ ciently close to the break-point. Thus, if the decision-maker
has a contract k11 < k12 and k13 < k12, the optimal action will be chosen if
s = 2. Otherwise, he may manipulate earnings. We now turn to the second
claimholder.
-
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Figure 3. a) k11 < k12, k13 < k12 and k21 > k22, k23 > k22; b)
k11 > k12 > k13 and k21 < k22 < k23.
His contract is k22 < k21 < k23. He will not substitute earnings if s = 3
(his RR are maximal in this case). Consider the case s = 1: We show that
there exists a set of contracts such that aj = 0 for any R.
We also show that earnings manipulation is unavoidable under some types
of contracts. Consider a contract k11 > k12 > k13 (Figure 3b, doted line) and
suppose s = 2: If j R Rt1 j is su¢ ciently small, a1 6= 0. The argument here
is similar to that in Lemma 3 for two-part linear contracts. If R is close to
the break-point, the decision-maker will manipulate earnings to attain this
threshold and increase his RR. The same holds for the second claimholder
with a contract k21 < k22 < k23 when s = 2. If j R   Rt2 j is su¢ ciently
small, a2 6= 0. Thus, if k11 > k12 > k13 (or k11 < k12 < k13) the rst-best
social surplus is not achievable.
Table 2 summarizes the optimal design of property rights when the con-
tracts are three-part linear (for the case when the rst-best is achievable).
As in the previous section, the analysis in this section can be generalized by
allowing a large number of claimholders.
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Table 2. Di¤erent rights of security holders when contracts are
three-part linear.
R < Rt1 Rt1< R < Rt2 R > Rt2
Claim 1
Current cash ow rights convex for low R, concave for large R (Figure 3a, thick line)
Current control rights No Yes No
Residual property rights Lower than when Higher than when Lower than when
Rt1 < R < Rt2 R < Rt1 or R > Rt2 Rt1 < R < Rt2
Claim 2
Current cash ow rights concave for low R, convex for large R (Figure 3a, doted line)
Current control rights Yes No Yes
Residual property rights Higher than when Lower than when Higher than when
Rt1 < R < Rt2 R < Rt1 or R > Rt2 Rt1 < R < Rt2
5 Implications.
The interpretation of the models results and their contribution to existing
literature is as follows.
1. The main result is the Rule of marginal revenues. The paper suggests
a rule for the link between current cash-ow rights and RR. If the current-
periods payo¤ is T (R1) then RR should be T 0(R1). This result has not
yet been explicitly tested in the literature though it seems to be consistent
with standard securities. Suppose, for example, that Bs contract is debt
and As contract is levered equity: T2(R1) = minfR1; Rt1g and T1(R1) =
maxf0; R1 Rt1g. If cash ow is greater than the face value of debt, Rt1, then
RR belong to the equityholder (T 01(R1) = 1), and if cash ow is less than the
face value of debt, the creditors have all RR (T 02(R1) = 1). This is consistent
with what is observed in practice and with early theoretical literature on
this topic (as was mentioned in the introduction). Now consider securities
which have been observed more frequently in practice with respect to venture
capital rms. Take, for instance, convertible preferred participating equity.
The venture capitalists (VCs) cash ow rights correspond to the following
two-part linear contract in our model: T1(R1) = minfR1;  + R1g, where
 > 0 and 0 <  < 1. When the rm is going public, the VCs fraction of
ownership will be . This usually happens when the business is doing well.
If the rm is doing poorly, the VCs fraction of ownership is unity. This is
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exactly what our model predicts. The argument is analogous for convertible
preferred equity: T1(R1) = maxf0; R1 Rt1g if R1 < D and = D+(R1 D)
if R1 > D.
2. The results regarding the allocation of control rights are similar to
those found in existing literature with standard securities such as a combi-
nation of straight debt and common equity. Our new contributions are as
follows. First, we jointly obtain the allocation of control rights and resid-
ual property rights. These rights are identical for standard securities (as we
argue below) but not for most of other securities. The di¤erence between
the allocation of control rights and residual property rights cannot be found
in existing literature, for instance, in Aghion and Bolton (1992). Second,
we obtain predictions for the allocation of control under three-part linear
contracts.
With regard to two-part linear contracts, Proposition 1 predicts that,
if interim cash ow is low, control belongs to the investor with a concave
claim. Otherwise, control belongs to the investor with a convex claim. To
give a classical example: if Bs contract is debt with face value Rt1 and the
current-periods prot is below Rt1, control should belong to B. Control
should belong to A otherwise. This result holds for any convex or concave
contract (not just debt and equity). In particular, the results are consistent
with convertible participating preferred equity.
Also, a di¤erence may exist between control rights and RR. For standard
debt and levered common equity they are identical: on the upside (when
R > Rt1) equity has 100% control and 100%RR, while on the downside (when
R < Rt1) debt has 100% control and 100% RR. However, the situation is
di¤erent for other two part linear contracts where joint ownership is possible
on both sides while control is allocated to only one party. Suppose that As
contract has the slope 0 on the downside and " on the upside (where " > 0).
It is a convex contract and therefore, when s = 1, A is the decision-maker.
However, his RR will be small in this case if " is su¢ ciently low. One can
have the same situation with a concave contract.
With regard to three-part linear contracts, the rst-best social surplus
can only be achieved if the contracts are like those in Figure 3a. In this case,
control belongs to A (thick line) if s = 1 or s = 3 and belongs to B if s = 2.
The natural interpretation of these contracts, for venture capital rms, is that
A is the investor (venture capitalist with convertible preferred equity) and B
is the entrepreneur. The results related to the allocation of control rights for
the cases where s = 1 (investors control) and s = 2 (entrepreneurs control)
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are similar to the cases with two-part linear contracts. The model also pre-
dicts that if s = 3 control should belong to the investor. This contributes to
existing literature which typically fails to explain why the investor often has
more control when the rms performance is "extremely good" than when
performance is simply "good" (see, for instance, Hart, 2001).
3. The situation with three-part linear contracts, where one contract
has increasing slopes and another contract has decreasing slopes, never pro-
vides the rst-best social surplus. Hence, we should not frequently observe
contracts like these in practice. To the best of our knowledge this is the case.
6 Conclusion.
Existing literature on property rights stresses the e¤ect that distortions in
future investment decisions have on establishing the optimal property rights.
This paper demonstrates that property rights may also be a¤ected by con-
tracts which exist prior to the establishment of property rights. It is shown
that the rule of marginal revenues is necessary to eliminate intertemporal
substitution (earnings manipulation). This result has not yet been explicitly
tested in existing literature though it seems to be consistent with standard
securities such as debt, equity, and convertible preferred equity. In contrast
to most existing theoretical literature, this paper explains why control rights
and residual property rights are not usually identical.
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